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LEGAL ASPECTS OF PRISON RIOTS
Ira P Robbins*

Introduction
Riots are a recurrent phenomenon in American prisons. In the
1950s and the early 1970s, major riots erupted in prisons across the
country, and many have occurred in the past several years.' Riots will
continue to occur as long as the dominant function of prisons is the
custodial confinement of inmates. As one commentator explains,
"Tihe way to make a strong bomb is to build a strong perimeter and
generate pressure inside. Similarly, riots occur where ...pressures
* Professor of Law and Pauline Ruyle Moore Scholar in Public Law
(1980-1981), The American University, Washington College of Law. A.B., University
of Pennsylvania, 1970; J.D., Harvard University, 1973. The author is grateful to
David M. Eppsteiner, a third-year student at The American University, Washington
College of Law, for his assistance in the preparation of this Article.
' Prison riots in the 1950s included disturbances at the Men's Prison in New
York, in 1951; Trenton State Prison and Rahway Prison Farm, in 1951; Michigan
State Penitentiary in 1952; Ohio State Penitentiary in 1952; and Lincoln Penitentiary,
Nebraska, in 1955.
Prison riots in the early 1970s included disturbances at Folsom Prison, California, in 1970; San Quentin Prison, California, in 1970; the Manhattan House of
Detention, New York, in 1970; and Florida State Prison, Raiford, Florida, in 1971;
New York State Prison, Attica, New York, in 1971. For a discussion of the history of
prison riots, see Garson, Force Versus Restraintin PrisonRiots, 18 Cain & DELINQUENCY 411 (1972). See generally AMERICAN CoRMECTIONAL AssOCIATION, RIOTS
ANDDISTuRBANiCEs

N CoaRcnoNA

INsTITunoNs

(1981); J. IRWIN, PuSONS

IN

Tumon, 24-26 (1980).
2 In February 1980, for example, a riot at the New Mexico Penitentiary in Santa
Fe left thirty-six inmates dead and ninety inmates seriously injured. See OMcE OF
THE ATToRNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF Tn ATToRNEY GENERAL ON FEBRUARY 2 AND
3, 1980 RIOT AT THm PENrTENTIARY OF NEW MExIco 1 (1980). A riot or disturbance
erupted at prisons in eight states during the nine month period from October, 1980 to
July, 1981. See Prison Riots and Violence, CORREcTONS COMPENDIUM, December
1981, at 1, 4-7 (on file with the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review).
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and demands are generated in the presence of strong custodial confinement."3
When such a bomb detonates and a prison riot erupts, a variety
of demands are placed upon the legal system. The violence and lawlessness characteristic of prison riots often result in extensive property
damage, personal injury, and death.4 Prison riots thus may trigger the
operation of both the civil and the criminal justice systems, for prison
riots may give rise to tort actions against the state by prisoners and by
guards and to criminal actions against the rioting prisoners.
In addition, the legal system must resolve certain problems
unique to the prison riot. To quell a riot, the state may grant amnesty
to the prisoners or enter into agreements not to prosecute them for acts
committed during the riot. The courts must decide whether a grant of
amnesty or a settlement agreement should be given legal effect. Courts
also may face first amendment claims involving the rioting prisoners'
ability to communicate with the press and the press' access to the
prison during the riot.
This Article will examine the legal issues generated by prison riots
from the perspective of three of the actors in those riots: the lawyer,
the prisoner, and the prison guard. Each actor obviously has differing,
and often competing, concerns and desires. In seeking to resolve these
concerns, however, each must confront obstacles springing from a
matrix of four factors: the traditional attitude of the courts toward
prisons, the lawless nature of the prison riot, the doctrines governing
the legal status of prisoners, and the jurisdictional rules governing lawsuits against the state and its officials.
I. Prison Riots and the Attorney
When the Attica prison riot erupted in 1971, one of the first noninmates to talk with the rioters was Herman Schwartz, an attorney
and law professor. Schwartz, who specialized in the area of prisoners'
I Fox, Why PrisonersRiot, 35:1 FED.

PROB. 9, 10

(1971). This Article does not

discuss the causes of prison riots directly, for there already isan extensive literature on
the subject.
' See generally NEw YoRK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON ATTICA, ATTICA:
THE OFFICIAL REPORT (1972) [hereinafter cited as ATTICA: Tim OmIctA. REPORT];
REPORT OF THE ATORmEY GENERAL, supra note 2; Garson, supra note 1.
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rights and who earlier had represented Attica inmates in lawsuits challenging conditions of confinement at the prison, offered his assistance
to state prison officials shortly after the riot began. The Commissioner
of Corrections told Schwartz that the inmates had asked for him, and
his offer of assistance was quickly accepted.'
During the next day, Schwartz entered the prison on five occasions to meet with the rioting prisoners. 6 Among the demands they
conveyed to him was an urgent one that they be permitted to negotiate
through a committee of third parties. Attorney William Kunstler
headed the list of individuals to serve on the committee.7 After meeting
with Kunstler and the other members of the committee, the prisoners
asked Kunstler to act as their lawyer. Kunstler agreed, and he actively
participated in the fruitless negotiations that preceded the forceful
recapture of Attica."
As the events at Attica illustrate, self-selection, the desires of the
inmates, and the needs of the state can combine to involve the lawyer
in a prison riot. Lawyers with an interest in prisoners' rights may offer
their services to inmates and officials during a prison riot. 9 The rioting
prisoners may turn to sympathetic attorneys for assistance because
they feel that they can trust such attorneys to represent their position
effectively. The state may believe either that productive negotiations
I ATTICA: THm OmncLAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 216. For a thorough discussion of the role played by attorneys during the Attica riot, see Schornhorst, The Lawyer and the Terrorist:Another EthicalDilemma, 53 IND. L.J. 679, 691-96 (1978).
6 ATricA: Tim OfficIAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 217-33; Schornhorst, supra
note 5, at 692-93.
ATTICA: TiE OmFIcIAL REPORT, supranote 4, at 218; Schornhorst, supra note
5, at 692.
SATTICA: Tim OSTICIAL REPORT, supranote 4, at 247; Schornhorst, supra note

5, at 694-96.
"Two concerns might persuade a civic-minded attorney to risk involvement.
First, the attorney may feel that because of his or her skills as a negotiator and
because of the trust that the inmates may place in him or her, the attorney can
advance negotiations between the inmates and the prison officials. See ATnCA: Tim
O criAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 217. Second, an attorney versed in the area of
prisoners' rights will recognize the prisoners' need for legal advice during and after
the return of control of the prison to officials. The attorney will want to ensure both
that the prisoners are not subject to unlawful retaliation and that proper legal proce-

dures are followed during the state's investigation of the riot and in the event that the
state seeks to impose criminal or administrative sanctions on the inmates. See
Schornhorst, supra note 5, at 697.
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through a third party are possible or at least that the appearance of
legal negotiations may serve to calm the riot.'I
The attorney who thus becomes involved in a prison riot faces
problems that are not present in routine legal practice. On the one
hand, the danger and unpredictability of the situation create unique
practical problems which can limit the effectiveness of the attorney.
On the other hand, the fact that prison riots involve illegal acts on the
part of a large class of individuals presents the attorney with serious
ethical problems. This section will analyze these problems by focusing
on attorney involvement during the course of a prison riot, for it is at
that time that the attorney's practical and ethical problems are most
acute.
A. PracticalLimitationson the Attorney's Involvement
in a PrisonRiot
The numerous roles in which an attorney might function during a
prison riot divide into two broad categories: the attorney can act on
behalf of the inmates or serve as a neutral mediator. In either capacity,
he or she will discover that the danger of the setting, the highly charged
adversarial relationship of the parties involved, and the difficulty of
communication in such circumstances create pressures and difficulties
that may undermine his or her effectiveness.
When acting on behalf of the rioting inmates-either as their representative during negotiations or as counsel seeking to protect their
rights-the attorney may be unable to gain access to the prison. Even
in the absence of a riot, access to prisons is limited; during a riot prison
officials may deny access altogether. The prison officials may not want
to provide the inmates with a potential hostage, or they may believe
that complete isolation of the inmates will foster a feeling of helplessness which will lead to an end to the riot. "
See Schornhorst, supranote 5, at 697. See also note 20 infra.
'See Schornhorst, supranote 5, at 694-96, 702. Schornhorst notes that on two
occasions during the riot at Attica, William Kunstler delivered speeches to the
inmates that indicated that the inmates might be successful in imposing their demands
on the prison officials. Schornhorst does not suggest that Kunstler's actions influenced the subsequent events at Attica, but his analysis points out why prison officials
may want to prevent inmate contact with attorneys who might in some manner
encourage the prisoners' cause.
30
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Yet gaining access duing the riot likely will be crucial for an
attorney acting on behalf of the inmates. He or she will be able to represent the interests of the inmates effectively in negotiations only if
there is direct contact with the inmates, and the attorney may feel that
if the inmates do not receive advice about their legal rights before
returning control of the prison, violation of those rights during the
post-riot period is more likely." As one study notes, "[P]roblems of
access can be exceptionally severe [in the post-disturbance period].
Prison officials can be expected to make every effort to thwart
attempts to gain entry to the premises, including those by attorneys."' 3
Gaining access to the prison, though, may be only half of the battle. Because both rioters and prison officials want to act quickly in
order to consolidate their positions or to force a retreat, the attorney
faces severe time constraints as well. There rarely will be an opportunity for deliberation or thorough preparation. It may be particularly
difficult to gather information from a large number of inmates in a
short period of time. 4
In addition, once inside the prison the attorney confronts two
further difficulties: personal danger and lack of inmate cooperation.
Even when present at the request of some of the prisoners, the attorney may be perceived by others as a part of the legal system that
imprisons them.I5 The attorney may be viewed as being more useful to
them as a hostage than as a representative. Moreover, the inmates'
general distrust of the legal system may inhibit them from cooperating
with the attorney. For fear of reprisals, prisoners may be unwilling to
,2See note 9 supra.
IS Hellerstein & Shapiro, PrisonCrisisLitigation:Problems and Suggestions, 21
BurtiAo L. Rnv. 643, 646 (1972). Hellerstein and Shapiro cite the Attica riot as an
example of the lengths to which prison officials will go to restrict access during the
post-riot period. After the Attica riot, prison officials denied access to the prison to a
group of lawyers and doctors, despite a court order that required their admission. Id.
at 647 n.9. See N.Y Times, Sept. 15, 1971, at 33, col. 2.
"See Hellerstein & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 646.
At Attica, for example, Herman Schwartz indicated to the inmates that,
because some of their demands were unrealistic, they should prepare more practical
demands. According to the Official Report, "ITihe inmates were in no mood to hear
a white lawyer tell them that their demands were impractical, and Schwartz was
derided by the crowd." One of the other noninmates present at the time quickly
defended Schwartz' record on prisoners' rights. ATTICA: THE OFFIcIAL REPORT,

supra note 4, at 218. See Schornhorst, supra note 5, at 692.
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talk with the attorney during the riot or to testify in court following
the riot.'6 They may also fear that any statements they might make

during the riot will be used against them in later criminal prosecutions
arising out of it. '

These problems-access, time constraints, personal danger, and
lack of inmate cooperation-render any activity on behalf of the
inmates difficult. In particular, it will be extremely difficult to use litigation as a tool to protect the inmates' rights. Certainly the options for
bringing litigation in the prison riot context are limited. It is true that
the attorney may seek an injunction against unlawful conduct by
prison officials during the course of the riot or in the post-riot
period.' Or the attorney can file a suit which challenges the prison
conditions that gave rise to the riot.I But the practical problems facing
an attorney during the riot directly interfere with such litigation
efforts. Even the most rapid injunctive relief may not come in time to
prevent unlawful behavior. Moreover, the inability to gain access to the
prison and the lack of inmate cooperation will in turn hinder the marshalling of information requisite for a successful lawsuit.
For the attorney who seeks to act as a neutral mediator between
the prison officials and the inmates, the problems of access and time
,6 See Hellerstein & Shapiro, supra note 13, at 660-61. Hellerstein and Shapiro

caution that, when initiating lawsuits against prison officials, attorneys must warn
every inmate about the possibility of reprisals if they testify: "Although courts are

becoming increasingly sensitive to this danger [of unlawful reprisals], the inmate
should also be apprised that he cannot be fully protected against all future harass-

ment in retaliation." Id. at 660.
"1In light of the inmates' distrust of the legal system and the possibility that the

attorney-client privilege does not apply to conversations about ongoing crime, the
prisoners' fear is far from irrational. See notes 29-32 and accompanying text infra.
"1See Hellerstein & Shapiro, supranote 13, at 644. During the Attica riot, Her-

man Schwartz obtained a federal court injunction prohibiting any reprisals against
inmates who participated in the riot. The inmates tore up the injunction, however,
because it did not contain a seal and referred only to the first day of the riot. ATIcA:
THE OFFiciAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 225-31. See Schornhorst, supra note 5, at

693. An injunction against unlawful conduct by prison officials during the post-riot
period also was obtained in the Attica case. Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v.
Rockefeller, 453 E2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
"1See Hellerstein & Shapiro, supranote 13, at 644. "Involvement of a court in
the crisis as quickly as possible brings needed exposure of official conduct by requir-

ing state officials to account for their actions in answering papers or by testimony at a
public hearing." Id. at 645.
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constraints may be diminished, but the difficulties arising from the
threat of personal danger and the lack of inmate cooperation may be
exacerbated. Prison officials who feel that negotiations are necessary
or desirable will allow the attorney access to the prison, and they may
be more willing to listen to the attorney's suggestion that the use of
force should be delayed. 0 On the other hand, a neutral mediator must

attempt to persuade the inmates to make concessions. The attorney
thus may find himself or herself in personal danger, as the object of
the inmates' hostile reaction to suggested concessions. And it is
unlikely that the inmates will be willing to cooperate with an attorney

who is proposing compromise.2
B. EthicalandLegal Limitations
on the Attorney's Involvement in a Riot
The attorney who is willing to face the numerous practical obsta-

cles to involvement in a prison riot will turn around to confront three
20 In several cases, negotiation has led to the peaceful termination of the riots.
See Garson, supra note 1, at 414-15, 417-18. The Commission that investigated the
Attica riot, however, concluded that prison officials should undertake negotiations
only if control of the prison cannot be regained without the use of lethal force. The
Commission also concluded that direct negotiations between the state and the
inmates are preferable to negotiations through a third party. ATICA: Tnn OFIcAL
REPORT, supranote 4, at 213. According to the Commission, the presence of third
parties in the negotiation process at Attica may have heightened the mistrust between
the inmates and the prison officials. Id. at 210.
The Attica commission did recognize, however, that negotiations are sometimes
necessary and that the use of third parties may be required. Id. at 213. Moreover, one
commentator who examined the Attica riot states that the law enforcement authorities believed that it was advantageous to allow the rioters to "proceed as iflegal negotiations were involved.... mhe Attica inmates would [not] trust the authorities
with whom they were dealing, and to supply a foundation of trust the authorities
invited (or at least welcomed) the intervention of lawyers?' Schornhorst, supra note
5, at 697. The fostering of the perception that productive negotiations were attempted
also might produce political benefits. One writer has argued that Mayor John V.
Lindsay of New York, in dealing with several prison riots, "pleased the liberals by
agreeing to meet with rioters, by granting reasonable (minor) reforms, and by not
incurring fatalities in his ultimate policy of force, and he appealed to law-and-order
voters by not agreeing to increasingly radical demands and by ending the riot through
force rather than negotiations!' Garson, supranote 1, at 419.
1 The threat of personal danger and the absence of inmate cooperation may be

742

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 16

equally difficult ethical and legal obstacles: involvement in illegal or
improper conduct; withdrawal of the attorney-client privilege; and
potential conflicts of interest. His or her confrontation of these problems is unavoidable, for they stem in a large part from two inherent
aspects of prison riots. First, prison riots and many of the acts committed during such riots are illegal. Second, prison riots involve a large
class of individuals who do not necessarily have identical interests.
These ethical and legal problems may prevent an attorney from assuming an active role in the riot.
1. Illegal or Improper Conduct
Canon 7 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Canon's disciplinary rules and ethical considerations govern the lawyer's role when the client's conduct may be illegal. According to Canon
7, "A Lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of
' Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(7) forbids a lawyer to "counsel
the law" 22
or assist his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent. ' 3 Finally, Ethical Consideration 7-5 states that a lawyer
who is acting as an adviser "may continue in the representation of his
client even though his client has elected to pursue a course of conduct
contrary to the advice of the lawyer so long as he does not24thereby
knowingly assist the client to engage in illegal conduct....
problems even when the attorney is accepted initially by both sides as a mediator. See
notes 5 & 15 and accompanying text supra.
22 ABA CODE OF PRoFssioNAL RESPONsmrr , CANON 7.
23 Id. DR 7-102(A)(7). The penalty for violations of the rule may be disbarment.
See, e.g., In re Robert G. Mann, 385 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. 1979); Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Edwards, 284 Md. 687, 399 A.2d 264 (1979).
The corresponding provision of the Proposed Final Draft of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct is Rule 1.2(d), which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not counsel or assist a client in conduct that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is
criminal or fraudulent... ." ABA COMssION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL
STANDARDS, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFT OF THE MODEL RUtLs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1981).
14 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmirrY EC 7-5. The ethical considerations under Canon 7 distinguish between the lawyer acting as advocate and the law-

yer acting as adviser. Both roles appear to be defined in the context of pending or
potential litigation. In the former role, the lawyer may urge any permissible construction of the law so long as there is a good faith basis for such a construction. In the
latter role, the lawyer may give his or her professional opinion about the likely deci-
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Because prison riots and many of the acts encompassed by them
are illegal, the lawyer involved in a riot must decide which of the various roles he or she can play are consistent with the norms of Canon 7.
As one commentator notes, the examples provided by the drafters of
the Code of Professional Responsibility of attorney conduct that is
improper under DR 7-102(A)(7) and EC 7-5 are inapplicable in the
prison riot context.25 The poles of clearly permissible and clearly
impermissible behavior are easily defined. A lawyer who advises the
rioting prisoners to release their hostages and to terminate the riot
would be acting in accordance with Canon 7. A lawyer who becomes a
participant in a prison riot would violate the norms of Canon 7.26
But neither of these extremes represents the probable form of the
attorney's involvement. The attorney will have little impact on the situation if he or she merely advises the inmates to end the riot, for the
inmates will be reluctant to cooperate with such an attorney.27 It is
equally unlikely that an attorney will become an active participant in a
riot. Hence it is the attorney who seeks to play a meaningful role who
faces the most difficult ethical decisions.28
The central issue for such a lawyer involves the interpretation of
the term "counsel or assist" in DR 7-102(A) (7) and the meaning of the
term "knowingly assist" in EC 7-5. Consider, for example, the attorney who represents the rioting inmates in negotiations with the prison
sion of the courts on the matter at hand. See id. EC 7-4, EC 7-5. Commentators
have criticized these ethical considerations for failing to recognize that, as an adviser,
the lawyer's role is broader than simply to give opinions about the likely outcome of
litigation. The lawyer as adviser may also assist in planning and shaping future transactions and conduct. See AMERIcAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmrY 283 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ABF ANNOTATED CODE].
For purposes of analyzing the lawyer's involvement in prison riots, a broad definition
of the concept of adviser will be assumed. Thus, EC 7-5 will be interpreted as applying to a lawyer who acts as a representative of prisoners in negotiations or who
informs them about their rights.
25 Schornhorst, supra note 5, at 699. See also ABF ANNOTATED CODE, supra
note 24, at 320-21.
26 See Schornhorst, supra note 5, at 697, 699; cf. Attorney Grievance Comm'n
v. Edwards, 284 Md. 687, 692, 399 A.2d 264, 267 (1979) (attorney who participated
in conspiracy to commit storehouse break-in found to have violated DR 7-102(A)(7)).
27 See Schornhorst, supra note 5, at 697-98; notes 15 & 21 and accompanying
text supra.
28 See Schornhorst, supra note 5, at 699.
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officials. He or she may be in the position not only of conveying the
prisoners' demands to the officials but also of evaluating and making
recommendations about the state's proposals. Therefore, it may be
argued that the attorney is counseling the inmates in illegal conduct or
assisting the cause of the riot. If Canon 7 is read strictly, the attorney
must either decline involvement in the riot or risk disciplinary sanctions.
2. Withdrawal of the Attorney-Client Privilege
and the Duty to Disclose
For the attorney who does become involved in a prison riot, the
criminal nature of prison riots generates two additional legal and ethical problems. First, under common law standards, the attorney-client
privilege does not apply to communications regarding future criminal
conduct by the client. 29 The future crime exception to the attorneyclient privilege has been interpreted as extending to ongoing crimes as
well.30 Because the attorney-client privilege may not protect communications with rioting inmates, an attorney may hesitate to act on behalf
of the inmates for fear that he or she may be required to testify against
the inmates in criminal proceedings arising out of the riot.
Second, the attorney involved in a prison riot who learns of
inmate plans to commit other crimes during the course of the riot may
have an ethical duty to disclose that information. DR 4-101(C)(3)
states that a lawyer may reveal "[tihe intention of his client to commit
a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime.""
Although the language of the rule indicates that disclosure is permissive rather than mandatory, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility has indicated that if the client informs
29See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); United States v. Shewfelt, 455 E2d 836, 840 (9th Cir. 1972); Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 E2d 1093,

1102-03 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally Gardner, The Crimeof FraudException to the
Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A.J. 708 (1961); Comment, The Failure of
Situation-OrientedProfessionalRules to Guide Conduct: ConflictingResponsibili-

ties of the CriminalDefenseAttorney Whose Client Commits or Intends to Commit
Perjury,55 WASH. L. REv. 211 (1979); Note, The Future Crimeor Tort Exception to
Communications Privileges,77 H v.L. REv. 730 (1964).
"0See, e.g., ABA Comm.ON PROI ssIoNA ETmcs, OPINIoNs, No. 155 (1936).
31 ABA CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONsBLrrY DR 4-101(C)(3).
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the attorney of an intent to engage in future misconduct, the attorney
is required to advise the client that he or she must either terminate representation of the client or disclose the client's intent.32 The attorney
involved in a prison riot once again finds that the legal profession's
ethical norms may prevent him or her from acting effectively on
behalf of the inmates.
3. PotentialConflicts of Interest
An attorney who contemplates acting in a prison riot on behalf of
the inmates must consider two types of conflicts of interest. First,
because the attorney may be one of the few noninmates present during
the riot, he or she may become a crucial witness to acts that could
become the subject of criminal or civil litigation. DR 5-101(B) forbids
an attorney from accepting "employment in contemplated or pending
litigation" in which he or she will be a witness.33 An attorney's involve32

ABA Comm.

ON

PROFESSIONAL

ETmcs, INFORML

OPNIONS, No. 1314

(1975). An earlier advisory opinion involving an army deserter indicated that the
attorney who learns of a client's intent to commit a crime must both terminate representation and reveal information about the crime:
[I]f the fugitive comes to see a lawyer concerning his rights, the information
given to the lawyer would be privileged. If, on the other hand, the fugitive
comes to see the lawyer in order to secure advice as to how he can best
remain a fugitive or a deserter in the future, then the lawyer is obliged:
(a) To advise him to turn himself in; and
(b)To refuse to represent him if he declines to do so; and
(c)To advise him that the lawyer will reveal his whereabouts to the
authorities if he persists in his illegal conduct and the matter is brought to
his attention again by the client.
ABA Comm.

ON

PROFESSIONAL ETcs, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1141 (1970). The

conflicting language of the two advisory opinions has not been reconciled. See ABF
ANNOTATED CODE,

supra note 24, at 178-79 (1979).

11ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILrrY DR 5-101(B). The corresponding provision in the Proposed Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 23, isRule 3.7:
(a) A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is
likely to be a necessary witness except where:
(1)the testimony relates to an uncontested issue;
(2)the testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or
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ment in a prison riot is unlikely to be undertaken initially with a view
toward litigation; therefore, DR 5-101(B) may not preclude the attorney from involvement at that early stage. But one who is familiar with
prison riots will know that post-riot litigation is common and that the
34
attorney is likely to be called to testify.
Even when the attorney knows that he or she will be a witness in
post-riot litigation, the attorney may assume a role on behalf of the
inmates if the conditions of DR 5-101(B)(4) are fulfilled. This rule
allows an attorney to represent a client if the denial of representation
would work a substantial hardship on the client "because of the distinctive value of the lawyer or his firm as counsel in the particular
case" and if the client desires representation despite knowledge of the
conflict of interest." In the prison riot context, where the inmates may
request the services of a specific attorney because of the trust that they
place in him or her, DR 5-101(B)(4) may be especially apposite.
The second potential conflict of interest arises because a riot
involves a large number of prisoners, at least some of whom are likely
to be represented by the same attorney. DR 5-105(C) allows a lawyer to
represent multiple clients only if "it is obvious that he can adequately
represent the interest of each," and "each consents to the representation after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation
on the exercise of his independent professional judgment... !'1 The
interests of inmates who are involved in a prison riot may diverge in
such a manner as to prevent adequate representation of a group of
them by one attorney. Some of the prisoners may have conspired to
cause the insurrection while others may have been drawn into the riot
involuntarily. Additionally, culpability for specific criminal acts during
(3)disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on
the client.
See also Drasanescu v. First Nat'l Bank of Hollywood, 502 E2d 550 (5th Cir. 1974)
(counsel removed from case because he was a material witness).
'"The obvious solution for the attorney is to inform the inmates that he or she
will act on their behalf during the prison riot but that they will have to find another
attorney to represent them in any post-riot litigation. It is unlikely, however, that an
attorney who makes such a disclaimer will receive a great deal of cooperation from
the inmates. See notes 15 &21 and accompanying text supra.
11ABA CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONsEBiirrY DR 5-101(B)(4).
36Id.
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the riot may vary among the inmates. Even if there are no conflicts
when the attorney initially becomes involved in the riot, they may arise
during the course of the riot. An act of violence against a prison
guard, for example, may cause a realignment of previously harmoni37
ous inmate interests.
C. Conclusion
Numerous practical, ethical, and legal problems limit an attorney's involvement in a prison riot. Yet there often are compelling reasons for an attorney to intervene in a riot; for example, the lawyer's
involvement may be at the request of the state. Professor Schornhorst
has recognized the ethical dilemma which an attorney faces when
encouraged to intervene in a prison riot. 38 He proposes an alternative
to Canon 7 to govern the lawyer's role during terrorist situations,
including prison riots:
A lawyer may counsel and negotiate on behalf of a terrorist
holding hostages so long as his or her efforts are directed to
a peaceful resolution of the matter and so long as the lawyer does not intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly increase
or prolong the danger to the hostages.39
This guideline embodies the conclusions that emerge from an examination of the attorney's role in a prison riot. In many instances, attorneys
may assume a meaningful role in a riot only if they are able to act on
behalf of the prisoners. The rules that govern an attorney's conduct,
however, may prevent him or her from assuming such a role. It must
be recognized, therefore, that rules governing attorneys in other contexts are largely inapplicable in the prison riot situation because of its
uniqueness.
1, See generally Geer, Representation of Multiple CriminalDefendants: Conflicts of Interest and the ProfessionalResponsibilities of the Defense Lawyer, 62
Mum. L. REv. 119 (1978).

11Schornhorst, supra note 5, at 699.
39 Id.
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II. Prison Riots and the Inmates
Prison riots may generate several legal questions that involve the
relationship between the state or its officials and prison inmates. This
section of the Article will examine the following issues which are likely
to arise in the prison riot context: (1)tort recovery for inmates killed or
injured during a prison riot; (2) causes of action for violations of the
prisoners' constitutional rights during a riot; (3) criminal prosecution
of inmates involved in a riot; (4) amnesty for participants in a riot and
the legal effect of agreements negotiated during a riot; and (5) prisoners' access to the media during a riot.
With the exception of the question of criminal prosecution of
participants in prison riots, each of these issues may involve claims by
the prisoners against the state or its officials. The prisoners thus may
be requesting the courts to pass judgment on the actions of prison officials or to compel those officials to pursue a given course of behavior.
In a tort action against the prison officials, for example, an inmate
asks the court to declare that the prison officials acted wrongfully in
responding to the disturbance as they did. Similarly, in bringing a
claim under the first amendment an inmate requests that the court
require prison officials to grant the inmates access to the media. In
short, the inmates, through the various legal claims to be discussed in
this section, seek to have the courts intervene in the relationship
between the prison administration and the prisoners.
It is this interventionist role which the courts traditionally have
shunned. Commonly known as the "hands-off" doctrine, this view
was predicated upon the belief that the inmate was a "slave of the
State"40 who had no rights for the sovereign to violate. Although modern jurisprudence has repudiated this belief, the doctrine retains vitality in part because of the judiciary's natural reluctance to intervene in
aspects of internal prison administration that appear to involve a high
degree of expertise and discretion."' Other reasons that are commonly
40 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871). See Exparte
Pickens, 101 E Supp. 285 (D. Alaska 1951). Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1
(exempting convicts from the proscription against slavery and involuntary servitude).
"' See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 407 (1974); Novak v. Beto,
453 E2d 661, 670 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972).
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given for nonintervention are subversion of prison discipline,42 the
potential flood of litigation,4 3 fear of creating instability in prison
management, 44 and conservation of the public fisc. 4' Moreover, cognizant of the principle of separation of powers, the courts even today
view corrections primarily as a matter of executive concern.46
The courts have been especially willing to defer to the judgment
of prison officials in matters involving prison discipline and internal
security.47 This attitude recently has received the imprimatur of the
Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish. 41 Emphasizing that the maintenance
of institutional security and the preservation of internal order and discipline are "essential goals," 9 the Court in Wofish concluded that
"[p]rison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that
in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline
and to maintain institutional security.'" As shall be seen below, it is
this deferential approach which is the key to both official action in the
prison riot context and the judicial response to that action.
42 See, e.g., Ortega v. Ragen, 216 E2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
940 (1955). See generally Haas, JudicialPoliticsand CorrectionalReform: An Analysis of the Decline of the Hands-OffDoctrine, 1977 DEr. C.L. REv. 795, 810-21.
41See generally Haas, supra note 42, at 821-29.
"See, e.g., Kaufman, Prison:The JudgehDilemma,41 FoRDHAM L. REv. 495,
507 (1973).
41See generally Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinaryin
InstitutionalLitigation, 93 HAnv. L. Rnv. 465, 506-07 (1980); Frug, The Judicial
Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. Rnv. 715, 725-26 &nn.71-72 (1978).
6 See generally Robbins & Buser, Punitive Conditions of Prison Confinement:
An Analysis of Pugh v. Locke and FederalCourt Supervision of State PenalAdministrationUnder the Eighth Amendment, 29 STA_. L. Rnv. 893 (1977). See also Note,
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of JudicialRefusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963).
41See, e.g., Childs v. Pegelow, 321 E2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963); Wilson v. Prasse,
325 E Supp. 9 (N.D. Pa. 1971). See also Wright v. McMann, 321 E Supp. 127
(N.D.N.Y. 1970); United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 E Supp. 7 (E.D.
Pa. 1965).
" Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). See generallyRobbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of Federal JudicialIntervention in Prison
Administration,71 J. CnIs. L. & Cinu. 211 (1980).
4' Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at
546.
50 Id. at 547. See also St. Claire v. Cuyler, 634 E2d 109 (3d Cir. 1980) (restricting
even preferred religious right in light of a perceived security need).
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A. Tort Recovery
Because of numerous jurisdictional, substantive, and practical
hurdles, inmates will find it difficult to recover damages for injuries
incurred during a prison riot. For state prisoners, the doctrines of sovereign and official immunity may shield the state and the prison officials from liability. For federal prisoners, recovery under the Federal
Tort Claims Act may be precluded because the injurious acts may fall
within one of the exceptions to the Act. For both state and federal
prisoners, presenting a primafacie tort case may prove difficult both
because of the wide discretion granted prison officials in the prison
riot context and because of the practical problems involved in marshalling favorable evidence.
1. State Law
The first jurisdictional obstacle a prisoner faces is the issue of his
or her capacity to bring a lawsuit under state law. A small minority of
states have statutes providing that prisoners be deemed civilly dead
while they are incarcerated. 5 ' Under such statutes, prisoners are unable
to bring lawsuits for personal injuries.5" These statutes do not, however, prevent a prisoner's family from prosecuting a wrongful death
action.
Once over this initial hurdle, the prisoner must locate a party
against whom a tort action may be brought. The prisoner may seek
damages from the state, the prison officials, or the prison guards.
Because it is the prison guard who is likely to have injured the inmate,
the guard appears to be the logical choice as defendant. For practical
reasons, however, the guard may not be a good candidate for suit; he
or she may not have the financial resources to provide full compensation.
1'E.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.05.070 & 11.05.080 (1970); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-310
to -311 (1979). A prisoner who is "civilly dead" is deemed to be dead as far as his or
her civil rights are concerned. See Quick v. Western Ry., 207 Ala. 376, 92 So. 608
(1922).
52 See Hill v. Gentry, 182 E Supp. 500 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd on othergrounds, 280
E2d 88 (8th Cir. 1960). See generallySpecial Project, The CollateralConsequencesof
a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REv. 929 (1970).
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Accordingly, the inmate may turn to the state or to the prison
officials as defendants with deeper pockets. But, for doctrinal reasons,
they may not be amenable to suit. Unless it consents to be sued, a state
is immune from tort liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity." A majority of states have consented to some degree, but the
scope of that consent varies.51 Some states have established courts of
claims or claims commissions to handle tort claims against the state. 5
Others have consented, but with the explicit exception that they cannot
be held liable for torts committed by their employees when the
employees are acting in a discretionary capacity. 6
If sovereign immunity shields the state from liability, a prisoner
may seek recovery from a prison official. However, the doctrine of
executive immunity-a corollary of the doctrine of sovereign immunity-may protect the prison official. To preserve the freedom of public officials to act vigorously and independently, courts have held that
public officials are immune from tort liability when acting in a discretionary, as opposed to a ministerial, capacity.57 Discretionary acts
involve the planning or policymaking aspect of the governmental process; ministerial acts involve the execution of policy. The line between
the two is not a clear one5 8 and the liability of prison officials will
depend on the law of the particular jurisdiction.
Tim LAw OF TORTS § 131, at 975-77 (4th ed. 1971).
See id. at 975, 984; Note, PhysicalSecurity in Prison:Rights Without Remedies?, 12 NEw ENGLAND L. Rav. 269, 274 (1976).
53See W. PROSSER,
54

55E.g., ARK.STAT. AN.

§ 13-1401 (1979); CoNN.

GEN. STAT.

§ 4-142 (1981);

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8 (Supp. 1980); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 44.070-.170 (1980);
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.6401-.6475 (1962); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 (Supp.

1979).

56

E.g., ALksKA STAT. § 09.50.250 (Supp. 1971); NEv. Rav. STAT. § 41.032
(1979). See notes 57-58 and accompanying text infra.
" See generally Comment, Prisoners'Rights: PersonalSecurity, 42 U. CoLo. L.
REv.305 (1970). But the immunity is more likely to be qualified than absolute. See
generally Cass, Damage Suits Against Public Officers, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1110
(1981).
" See Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal. App. 148, 162, 189 P.462,468 (1920)
("[Lit would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if
it involved only the driving of a nail:'). CompareUpchurch v. State, 51 Hawaii 150,
454 E2d 112 (1969) (adoption of rules and regulations governing prison security and
acts pursuant to such rules and regulations within discretionary function of prison
authority) with Smith v. Miller, 241 Iowa 625, 40 N.W.2d 597 (1950) (sheriff person-
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Assuming the amenability of the state or its officials to a tort lawsuit, there are two substantive theories upon which the inmate can

ground recovery. First, if the injury occurred because of the wrongful
acts of prison guards, the inmate may invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior to impute liability to the state or the prison officials. 9

Second, if the inmate is injured by a prison guard or another inmate,
the inmate may argue that the prison officials violated their duty under
the common law or a state statute to ensure the physical security of
inmates.6 In turn, the inmate may seek to impute liability to the state

under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the prison officials' violation of their duty of care. 6 '

Under either theory, however, the requisite showing that the
prison officials or the prison guards acted wrongfully may prove difficult. As one commentator has explained, "Mhe state has not only a
right but a duty to use all suitable means to enforce and maintain discipline in state prisons. '' 62 Thus, the standard of care during a prison riot
ally liable for negligent or wrongful acts that result in injury or death of prisoners).
See generallyR. GoLDFrm & L. SINGER, ATER C VlCTION 439-42 (1973). See also
notes 82-85 and accompanying text infra.
19 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the state or the prison officials are
liable for the wrongful acts of the prison guards if the prison guards were acting
within the scope of their authority and if the state or its officials could have reasonably foreseen, and thus prevented, the wrongful acts. See, e.g., Parker v. State, 282
So. 2d 483, 486 (La. 1973). See generally Comment, supra note 57, at 318. In the
prison riot context, a prison guard who is directed to use force would be acting within
the scope of his or her authority. In light of the often chaotic nature of prison riots,
however, it may prove difficult to demonstrate that the state or its officials could
have foreseen that the guard would act wrongfully. Imputation of liability to the state
may prove to be especially difficult. "The further removed the defendant is from the
wrongdoer, the more tenuous is his control over the wrongdoer's acts and, consequently, the less likely it is that the requirements of respondeat superior will be met."
Id. at 319.
60At common law, prison officials have a duty to exercise reasonable care to
protect the inmates within their custody. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 486 E2d
284, 287 (8th Cir. 1973). See generally Note, State Liability to Innocent Prisonersin
Prison Uprisings, 29 WAsH. & LEE L. Rnv. 119 (1972); Plotkin, Surviving Justice:
Prisoners'Rightsto be Freefrom PhysicalAssault, 23 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 387 (1974).
Many states have augmented this common law duty by imposing specific statutory
duties on prison officials. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2650-2655 (West 1970);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 6517 (1979).
6'See note 59 supra.
Note, supra note 60, at 125.
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may be low, and the use of force warranted.63 In fact, consistent with
their traditional deferential attitude toward prisons,"' courts have been
reluctant to impose tort liability on the state or its officials for fear that
such restrictions might prevent or delay prison officials from taking
the steps necessary to quell a prison riot. 65 Instead, the courts have
indicated that prison officials have a wide range of discretion in deter66
mining how to respond to a disturbance.
An inmate who does present a prima facie tort case nevertheless
may be barred from recovery if the state or the prison officials make a
showing of contributory negligence or assumption of risk.67 If the
plaintiff was an active participant in the prison riot, these defenses
may be particularly apposite. One court has defined contributory negligence on the part of a prisoner as "conduct which amounts to a
breach of duty to protect one's self-conduct that falls below a societal
standard.' 68 The state or the prison officials thus may claim that a participant in a riot did not act to protect himself or herself. They also
may claim that the inmate who participated in a riot assumed the risk
of injury. This latter defense is available when the plaintiff voluntarily
encountered a known or foreseeable danger. 69 The use of force during
a prison riot perhaps is foreseeable, for prison officials have used force
to quell prison riots on numerous occasions. 7" Thus, an inmate who
chooses to participate in a prison riot arguably assumes the risk of
incurring an injury during the riot.
Several practical obstacles compound the difficulty of prosecuting a tort suit in the prison riot context. First, because outsiders are
unlikely to be present during the riot, the lawsuit usually pits the testimony of inmates against that of prison officials and prison guards.
Given the relative status of the witnesses, the testimony of the latter
63See Roberts v. Pegelow, 318 E2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963).
6 See text accompanying notes 40-50 supra.
6

See Wilson v. Prasse, 325 E Supp 9 (W.D. Pa. 1971). See generally Note,

supra note 60, at 127.
66See, e.g., Collins v. Schoonfield, 363 E Supp. 1152 (D. Md. 1973).
67 See, e.g., Webber v. Omaha, 190 Neb. 678, 211 N.W.2d 911 (1973); Burdick
v. State, 206 Misc. 839, 135 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1954), aff'd without opinion, 286 A.D.
988, 144 N.Y.S.2d 740 (1955).
6 Breaux v. State, 326 So. 2d 481, 484 (La. 1976).
69 See W. PROSSER, supra note 53, § 68.
7

See generally Garson, supra note 1.
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two groups is likely to receive greater weight. Furthermore, the prisoner may encounter difficulty in obtaining witnesses. Prison guards
are unlikely to give testimony favorable to inmates, and sympathetic
inmate witnesses may not cooperate because "they have little to gain
personally and much to lose by way of retribution "'7 Finally, it may be
difficult for an inmate, who loses
little or no income as a result of his
72
injury, to establish damages.
2. FederalLaw
The major avenue of recovery for inmates injured during a riot
at a federal prison is the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),73 under
which the United States has waived its sovereign immunity from tort
liability.74 Rejecting a variety of arguments, including the contention
that application of the statute to prisoners' tort claims would undermine prison discipline, the Supreme Court held in United States v.
Muniz" that federal prisoners' tort claims were cognizable under the
FTCA.
Recovery under the Act, however, is far from certain. In the first
place, the Act carves out several exceptions. One is that the United
States is not liable for intentional torts.7" Prior to 1974, it was clear
that a federal prisoner could not recover under the Act for injuries that
resulted from an assault by a prison official. 77 In 1974 the FTCA was
I' See Note, Logue v. United States: PrisonerTort Recovery, 41 UMKC L. Rwv.
308, 310 (1972).
72See id.
73 28 U.S.C. §§ 1436(b), 2671-2680 (1976). The FTCA provides in pertinent
part: "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating
to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual
under like circumstances... ' Id. § 2674.

,4See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962); Rayonier, Inc. v.
United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957).
75 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
71 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976) provides that the United States shall not be liable
for "any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-

cious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with contract rights."
"See, e.g., Samurine v. United States, 287 E Supp. 913 (D.Conn. 1967), affd,
399 E2d 60 (2d Cir. 1968).
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amended to provide that the United States would be liable for certain
intentional torts if they were committed by federal investigative or law
enforcement officials." The statute defines federal law enforcement
officers as individuals "empowered by law to execute searches, to seize
evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law"' Federal
prison wardens execute searches, 0 and employees of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons are empowered to make arrests." The language of
the statute thus supports an argument that the United States should be
liable for intentional torts committed by prison wardens and prison
guards. However, no court has decided whether the 1974 amendment

applies in the prison context.
A second exception to the FTCA provides that the United States
shall not be liable for negligent acts or omissions committed by federal
employees in the course of performing discretionary functions,
whether or not that discretion is abused.8 2 Confusion and uncertainty
characterize judicial and academic attempts to define the scope of the
" The 1974 amendment added the following proviso to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h):
That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement
officers of the United States Government, the provisions of this chapter
and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claim arising, on or after
the date of the enactment of this proviso, out of assault, battery, false
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For
the purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer"
means any officer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute
searches, to seize evidence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
Pub. L. No. 93-253, 88 Stat. 50 (1974) (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976)).
7928 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976).
11 See Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919); Hayes v. United States, 367
E2d 216 (10th Cir. 1966).
81 18 U.S.C. § 3050 (1976).
8228 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976). The exception states that the FTCA shall not
apply to
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation,
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
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discretionary function exception.83 Nevertheless, it is probable that a
prison official's decision about the best manner in which to respond to
a prison riot would be held to fall within it."' It is arguable, however,
that the acts undertaken by prison guards to implement that decision
do not fall within the exception.8"
If a prisoner's tort claim does not fall within the intentional tort
or discretionary function exceptions to the FTCA, the inmate then
must demonstrate that the prison officials or the prison guards acted
wrongfully. The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United
States, but it does not provide the substantive rule of decision for tort
suits against the federal government. According to the Act, the
"United States shall be liable.., in the same manner and to the same
extent as a private individual under like circumstances."8 6 The import
of this provision for prisoners' tort claims is not clear. In Muniz, the
Court stated that the duty of care owed to federal prisoners is fixed by
federal statute regardless of state law providing that there be no such
duty.87 The Court also indicated, however, that the determination
whether that duty is violated depends upon the tort law of the state in
which the injury to the prisoner occurred.88 A federal prisoner thus
may encounter the same substantive difficulties in prosecuting a tort
suit as his or her state counterpart.8 9
In fact, the courts have been reluctant to grant recovery to prisoners under the FTCA, whether applying the relevant state law or
interpreting independently the federal statutory duty of care. One
court has indicated both that the conduct of prison officials must be
judged "under the circumstances" and that an inmate who instigates
trouble with other inmates cannot recover for the resulting injuries.9"
" For a discussion of the uncertainty surrounding the discretionary function
exception, see Reynolds, The DiscretionaryFunctionException to the FederalTort

Claims Act, 57 Gao. L.J. 81 (1968). See also notes 57-58 and accompanying text
supra.
" See Garza v. United States, 413 E Supp. 23 (W.D. Okla. 1975).
" See Cohen v. United States, 252 F Supp. 679 (N.D. Ga. 1966), rev'd on other
grounds, 389 E2d 689 (5th Cir. 1967). See generally Reynolds, supra note 83.
"28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
'

374 U.S. at 164-65.

'

Id. at 153.

"See text accompanying notes 59-70 supra.
90 Johnson v. United States, 258 E Supp. 372, 376-77 (E.D. Va. 1966).
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Another court has denied recovery where an inmate was killed by fellow inmates the day after a disturbance at the prison.9 ' According to
the court, the prison officials had followed "recognized" procedures
in response to the disturbance, and they could not have prevented the
unforeseeable incident which led to the inmate's death unless they had
exercised more than ordinary care.9 2 No court has decided a case
under the FTCA arising from a full-scale prison riot, but given the
spontaneous and unpredictable nature of such riots, a successful prisoner tort suit appears to be unlikely.
B. ConstitutionalCauses of Action
Because of the numerous difficulties involved in obtaining tort
relief, the inmate may turn to a constitutional cause of action to seek
redress for wrongs suffered during a prison riot. A suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or a direct cause of action under the eighth amendment
may avoid many of the jurisdictional problems involved in a state tort
suit. But such actions are not without their own jurisdictional and substantive difficulties.
For state prisoners who are aggrieved during a riot, section 1983
provides a cause of action to redress the inmates' federal constitutional
or statutory rights.93 Although states are immune from suit under section 1983,9' both municipalities and other local government units-as
well as "persons"-are amenable to suit.95 A significant hurdle to a
91Garza v. United States, 413 E Supp. 23 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
92

Id. at 26.

9342 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (1976) provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
94 U.S. CoNsT. amend. XI. See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Of course, a state may waive its immunity. See notes 53-56 and accompanying text
supra.
95 See Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See also Owen
v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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section 1983 damages claim, however, is the affirmative defense of
official immunity,96 which is analogous to executive immunity in tort
litigation. 97 In order to defeat this defense, a prisoner must show either
that the official knew or should have known that his or her action
would violate the prisoner's constitutional rights or that the action
complained of was done with malicious intent. 9 Because both showings are difficult, damage awards are rare. But injunctive relief is still a
possibility.99
Another potential obstacle is the doctrine of exhaustion of state
administrative remedies. The Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on
whether exhaustion is required.' 0 Many lower courts, however, still
require it, and prisoners in those jurisdictions will have to follow the
appropriate procedures, absent futility or exceptional circumstances.' 0 '
To prosecute a section 1983 claim successfully, for either damages
or injunctive relief, a prisoner must establish that his or her constitutional rights were violated. In the prison riot context, the eighth
amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment'02 may
"' See, e.g., Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416
U.S. 232 (1974).
9, See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
"1See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
" See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 486 E2d, 284, 288 (8th Cir. 1973).
100While the Court sidestepped the issue in its 1980 Term, see Parratt v. Taylor,
101 S.Ct. 1980 (1981); Jenkins v. Brewer, 654 E2d 1106 (7th Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 101 S.Ct. 1338 (1981), it has accepted certiorari in the 1981 Term. Patsy v.
Florida Int'l Univ., 102 S. Ct. 88 (1981), granting cert. to 634 E2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981)
(en bane). Even with an exhaustion requirement, however, section 1983 relief is not
foreclosed; it is only delayed.
202 On administrative exhaustion under section 1983, see Aldisert, Judicial
Expansion of FederalJurisdiction:A FederalJudges Thoughts on Section 1983,
Comity and the FederalCaseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 557; Chevigny, Section
1983 Jurisdiction:A Reply, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1352 (1970); Comment, Exhaustion of
State AdministrativeRemedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 537 (1974);
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. Rnv. 1133,
1264-74 (1977); Annot., 47 A.L.R. FED. 15 (1980).
,20The eighth amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VIII. The cruel and unusual punishment clause has been made applicable to
the states via the fourteenth amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962).
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provide the basis for a section 1983 claim. 0 3 The use of force to quell a
prison riot does not in itself, however, constitute a violation of the
eighth amendment. Consistent with their traditional attitude toward
prisons, 0 4 courts have tended to defer to prison officials' decisions to
respond to a prison disturbance with force.' 5 Moreover, federal courts
have tended to view problems in state prisons as a matter of state con06
cern.1
At least one court, however, has determined that the use of force
in the prison riot situation is not without limits under the eighth
amendment. In Inmates of Attica CorrectionalFacility v. Rockefeller,'0 the prisoners sought an injunction prohibiting unlawful reprisals
during the post-riot period. The court granted the preliminary injunction on the ground that the "barbarous conduct" of the prison guards
"was wholly beyond any force needed to maintain order. It far
exceeded what our society will tolerate on the part of officers of the
law in custody of defenseless prisoners""0 8 Significantly, though, the
court went on to state that "[i]f the abusive conduct of the prison
guards had represented a single or short-lived incident, unlikely to
recur, or if other corrective measures had been taken to guarantee
against repetition, injunctive relief might be denied, despite the heinous character of the conduct."0 9 In effect, the court in Inmates of
Attica established two requirements for receiving injunctive relief in
the riot context. First, the conduct of the prison officials and the
prison guards must be far in excess of that which is required to maintain security. Second, the conduct must be capable of repetition.
No reported case has awarded monetary damages to prisoners in
a section 1983 suit arising from a prison disturbance. The court in
"03
See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 E2d 12
(2d Cir. 1971); Collins v. Schoonfield, 363 E Supp. 1152 (D. Md. 1973); Poindexter
v. Woodson, 357 E Supp. 443 (D. Kan. 1973), aff'd, 510 E2d 464 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 846 (1975); Beishir v. Swenson, 331 E Supp. 1227 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
104

See text accompanying notes 40-50 supra.

1o See, e.g., Collins v. Schoonfield, 363 E Supp. 1152 (D. Md. 1973); Poindexter v. Woodson, 357 F Supp. 443 (D. Kan. 1973), aff'd, 510 E2d 464 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 846 (1975); Beishir v. Swenson, 331 E Supp. 1227 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
16 See generally Robbins & Buser, supra note 46. See also Note, supra note 46.
453 E2d 12 (2d Cir. 1971).
109Id. at 22.
109Id. at 23.
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Belshir v. Swenson"' suggested, however, that damages would be
appropriate if the inmates could demonstrate that the prison officials'
conduct "shocked the conscience" or went beyond that which is necessary to achieve a legitimate penological objective. On the facts of the
case, though, the court held that the use of fire hoses and mace to
quell the disturbance and the placement of the inmates in seclusion
cells did not violate the eighth amendment.'
The difficulty of recovering damages presents a dilemma for the
inmate who is aggrieved during a riot. Injunctive relief is available only
if the injurious conduct might recur. But the use of force to quell a
prison riot is a one-time occurrence. Therefore, without the availability of monetary damages, prisoners may have no direct remedy for the
use of force during a prison riot even if that force is excessive.
A second avenue of relief for the violation of constitutional rights
is a direct right of action under the Constitution. Injunctive relief is
permissible in such an action," 2 and the Supreme Court recently held
in Carlson v. Green ' 3 that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not preclude an action for damages under the eighth amendment.1 4 It is
likely, however, that the courts will be as reluctant to find eighth
amendment violations in a direct cause of action as they have been to
allow recovery in section 1983 suits." 5
110
331 E Supp. 1227, 1234 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
,1Id. at 1235.
112See,

e.g., ExparteYoung, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally Dellinger, Of
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1542
(1972); Hart, The RelationsBetween State andFederalLaw, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 489,

524 & n.124 (1954); Note, The Limits of Implied ConstitutionalDamages Actions:
New BoundariesFor Bivens, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1238, 1238 n.1 (1980).
"1 446 U.S. 14 (1980).
"1 Prior

to Carlson,lower courts had refused to recognize an eighth amendment

damage remedy on the ground that the Federal Tort Claims Act provided the exclu-

sive remedy for violations of the eighth amendment. See, e.g., Torres v. Taylor, 456 E
Supp. 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The Supreme Court first recognized a damage remedy in
direct constitutional actions in a suit under the fourth amendment. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Subsequently, damage remedies have
been implied under other constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Dellums v. Powell, 566
F2d 167, 194-95 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978) (first amendment); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 E2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1977),
rev'd in part,aff'd in parton othergroundssub. nom Lake Country Estates v. Tahoe

Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391 (1979).

1,S See text accompanying notes 102-09 supra. See also Note, supranote'112.
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C. Criminal Sanctionsfor PrisonRiots
1. FederalLaw
Under federal law, "[W]hoever instigates, connives, willfully
attempts to cause, assists, or conspires to cause" a mutiny or riot in a
federal correctional institution can be imprisoned for as many as ten
years. ' 6 The federal inmate can be prosecuted for his or her involvement in the riot itself, as well as for crimes that he or she commits
during the riot.1' 7 Further, since courts generally have held that administrative punishment does not render a subsequent criminal proceeding
violative of the fifth amendment prohibition against double jeopardy," 8 administrative proceedings against a rioting prisoner do not
preclude criminal prosecution.
The major unresolved issue in litigation under the federal prison
riot statute is the degree of participation necessary to sustain a finding
of criminal liability. The Tenth Circuit has held that the inclusion of the
term "willfully" indicates that mere participation in the riot is not sufficient." 9 Other courts, however, have adopted a broader view. In
United States v. Farries,2 0 for example, the Third Circuit reasoned
that the use of the word "assists" in the statute indicates that anyone
who participates in the riot falls within its reach.
The difficulty in distinguishing between principals and participants undercuts the validity of either interpretation. The Tenth Circuit's view is underinclusive because it imposes a high threshhold of
culpability. In contrast, the Third Circuit's interpretation is overinclusive because of the low threshold of culpability that it requires. A
"-'18 U.S.C. § 1792 (1976). Prisoners participating in a riot may also be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 2, which subjects one who aids or abets in the commission of
federal crimes to the same penalties as the principal. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).

11'See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 542 E2d 805 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1101 (1977) (inmate convicted of causing a riot under 18 U.S.C. § 1792 and
of assault with intent to murder during riot at federal penitentiary).
118See, e.g., United States v. Acosta, 495 E2d 60 (10th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Stucky, 441 E2d 1104 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 841 (1971).
1" See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 419 E2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1969), cited with
approvalin United States v. Bedwell, 456 E2d 448 (10th Cir. 1972).
12 459 E2d 1057 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1088 (1972). See also United
States v. Bryant, 563 E2d 1227 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 972 (1977).
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possible intermediate position is to require
that the state make a show21

ing of criminal, but not specific, intent.
There have been few reported cases under the federal prison riot

statute perhaps because the government, rather than to proceed under

the statute, prefers to seek conviction for discrete substantive offenses
committed during the riot. Furthermore, federal prison officials may
choose to employ administrative sanctions rather than initiate criminal
prosecution. Administrative proceedings do not receive the same

amount of publicity as criminal prosecutions nor are prisoners entitled
to the same constitutional protections.' 22 Such proceedings thus allow
federal prison officials greater flexibility in punishing participants in a
riot.
2. State Law
Several states have enacted statutes that prohibit inmate participation in prison riots. 23 In addition, some states have enacted statutes
that prohibit the taking of hostages by inmates. 24 A prisoner may be
convicted under either or both provisions.' 25 Such statutes serve to
supplement state criminal code provisions that the state may invoke to
2 SeeUnited States v. Hill, 526 F2d 1019, 1026-27 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 940 (1976).
22 See Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.
215 (1976).
22 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-11-11 (1975); COLO. REv. STAT. § 18-8-211 (Supp.
1980); CON .GEN. STAT. §§ 53a-179b to -179c (1981); Mo. Ar. STAT. § 216.460
(Vernon 1962); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-724 (1975); WASH. REV. CODE §
9.94.010-.020 (1979). The Florida Corrections Code, for example, provides that:
"Whoever instigates, contrives, willfully attempts to cause, assists, or conspires to
cause any mutiny, riot, or strike in defiance of official orders, in any state correctional institution, shall be guilty of a felony of the second degree... " FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 944.45 (West 1973).
2" See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4503 (West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 944.44 (West Supp. 1981); MAsS. Am. LAWS ch. 127, § 38A (Michie/Law. Co-op
1972). The Washington provision states: "Whenever any inmate of a state penal institution shall hold, or participate in holding, any person as a hostage, by force or violence, or the threat thereof, or shall prevent or participate in preventing an officer of
such institution from carrying out his duties, by force or violence, or the threat
thereof, he shall be guilty of a felony.. . : WASH. Rnv. CODE § 9.94.030 (1979).
'" See, e.g., State v. Davis, 48 Wash. 2d 513, 294 P.2d 934 (1956) (offenses of
prison rioting and holding hostages are distinct and carry separate penalties).
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prosecute inmates for acts committed during the course of the riot.
Prisoners have been convicted of murder,'2 6 kidnapping, 27 and false
imprisonment,' 28 as well as for participation in a riot'29 and for taking
hostages during a riot.'30 But there have been few prosecutions under
state prison riot or hostage-taking statutes. States, like the federal government, may often choose to seek conviction for specific criminal
violations committed during the riot or to employ administrative sanctions against participants in a prison riot.
One serious constitutional question that is raised by the criminal
prosecution of rioting prisoners concerns the imposition of the death
penalty after a conviction for murder. At one time, at least two states
had enacted statutes that prescribed a mandatory death sentence for
convicts serving a life sentence who committed first degree murder.'
Underlying such statutes is the notion that only the threat of capital
punishment will deter such prisoners from committing further crimes.
The Supreme Court has reserved judgment on the constitutionality of
a mandatory death penalty in such circumstances, indicating that "a
prisoner serving a life sentence presents a unique problem that may
justify such a law " 3' 2 At least one state court has found such a statute
to be constitutional, 1 3 while other state courts have reached the opposite conclusion.
'34

See, e.g., Johnson v. Alabama, 335 So. 2d 663 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976); People v. Stamps, 52 Ill.
App. 3d 320, 326, 367 N.E.2d 543, 548 (1977).
1',
See, e.g., State v. Wooten, 73 N.J. 317, 374 A.2d 1204 (1977).
128See, e.g., id.
129 See, e.g., Conte v. Cardwell, 475 E2d 698 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 873 (1973) (denial of state prisoner's habeas corpus petition following conviction
for participation in prison riot at the Ohio State Penitentiary); State v. Greene, 255
S.C. 548, 180 S.E.2d 179 (1971) (affirming conviction for violation of prison riot
126

statute).
,30
See, e.g., State v. Gann, 254 Or. 549, 463 P.2d 570 (1969) (reversing and

remanding on procedural grounds conviction for taking guards hostage in riot at
Oregon State Penitentiary in violation of statute that prohibited such acts).
,3'
Ai. CODE § 13-11-2(a)(6) (1975) (repealed 1981); LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.30(3) (1974) (repealed 1976).
32

Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334 n.9 (1976). See Woodson v. North

Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287 n.7, 292 n.25 (1976).

,31
Harris v. State, 352 So. 2d 479 (Ala. 1977). The court reasoned that the death

penalty was the only effective punishment for a life term prisoner. Id. at 484-85.
'34

State v. Cline, - R.I. -, 397 A.2d 1309 (1979). Other courts have found

similar statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., Graham v. Superior Court, 98 Cal. App.
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3. Issues Common to Federaland State CriminalCases
An inmate charged under federal or state statutes may encounter
practical problems in preparing a defense. Because most or all of the
potential witnesses are likely to be incarcerated, lack of access to the
witnesses and lack of cooperation from them may impede preparation
of the defense. Moreover, the preservation of prison security might
justify the imposition of restrictions that hinder defense preparation.
In United States v. Farries,' for example, the defendants argued that
their administrative segregation following participation in a prison disturbance prevented the adequate preparation of their cases. 136 The
court of appeals rejected the argument on the ground that the district
court "took every reasonable step consistent with prison security and
witness safety to expedite the efforts of defense counsel and of the
appellants to prepare and present whatever defense might be available." t37
Finally, inmates who are the subject of post-riot investigations
that may lead to criminal prosecutions are entitled to certain constitutional protections. Courts have held that official investigators must
issue the warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona'38 when questioning inmates about a disturbance, if the investigation may result in
criminal prosecution. 39
' However, the prisoner's right to constitutional
protections during a post-riot investigation is "subject to such restric3d 880, 160 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1979) (California mandatory death penalty for life prisoners who commit assault is unconstitutional).
35459 E2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972).
136See id. at 1062.
' Id. The district court took the following steps to allow the defense to prepare
its case: (1) defense counsel were given the names of the inmates in the prison on the
day of the disturbance; (2) defense counsel were allowed to interview any inmate; (3)
the defendants were allowed to observe all of the inmates to point out any whom they
wanted interviewed; (4) an announcement was made over the prison loudspeaker
advising any inmate with information to convey to send a letter directly to the court;
and (5) the defendants were allowed to confer together each evening during the trial.

See id.
","

384 U.S. 436 (1966).

,19See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 453 E2d 12,
21 (2d. Cir. 1971); Blyden v. Hogan, 320 E Supp 513, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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tions as are reasonably and necessarily required in light of his incarceration pursuant to his prior conviction on other charges" ' 1"

D. Amnesty and Negotiations
Amnesty from prosecution for crimes committed during a riot is
typically one of the prisoners' demands in negotiating the settlement of

a riot. Indeed, one of the major stumbling blocks to a peaceful settlement of the Attica prison riot was Governor Rockefeller's unwillingness to grant amnesty to those inmates who were involved in the d,-

turbance.' 4 ' Rockefeller stated that as a matter of principle he would
not grant amnesty even if he possessed the constitutional authority to
do so. '4
The power of a governor to grant amnesty in state prison riots

and the power of the President to do so in federal prison riots are matters of constitutional law. It is quite clear that prisoners who participate in a prison riot do not have a right to amnesty. As one court has
stated in another context, "Mhose who knowingly disobey a law must
face the penalty for the violation. They have no right to amnesty!""
This interpretation finds support in early Supreme Court decisions
where the Court described amnesty and pardon as acts of mercy or

grace.144
The extent of the chief executive's authority to grant amnesty is

not as clear. As does the United States Constitution, many state constitutions empower the chief executive to grant pardons.' 4 The Supreme
140Inmates of Attica, 453

E2d at 20.

See ATrcA: Tim OFmCALm REPORT, supranote 4, at 210-11, 325-36.
'42ATICA: Tmw'OmciA REPORT, supranote 4, at 211. It is a commonly held
141

belief that amnesty should not be granted because such a concession would encourage
prisoners to riot. This rationale is similar to that which justifies a refusal to negotiate
at all with rioting prisoners. See generally Garson, supranote 1.
,41Air Transp. Ass'n v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 313 E Supp.
181, 187 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 915 (1971). One commentator has
interpreted the holding in this case to mean that the judiciary is precluded from granting amnesty absent appropriate direction from either the legislature or the executive.
Comment, Amnesty: An Act of Grace, 17 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501, 515 (1973).
,'4 See, e.g., ExparteWells, 59 U.S. (19 How.) 307, 311 (1855); United States v.
Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160 (1833).
,, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. See, e.g., ILL. CoNsT. art. 5, § 12; IND. CONST. art.
5,

§ 17; KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 7; Ky. CoNsT. § 77; Omo CoNsT. art III, § 11.
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Court has indicated that the President's power to grant amnesty is
implicit in the executive pardoning power, ' 6 and some state courts
have followed this interpretation.'4 7 However, several state constitutions explicitly limit the pardoning power of the governor. In these
states the governor may only exercise his power to pardon, to reprieve,
or to commute sentences after conviction.' 4 8 Such a limitation precludes a governor from granting amnesty to participants in a prison
riot.
Constitutional provisions limiting the authority of the governor
may not preclude the legislature from granting amnesty to the rioting
prisoners, but a legislative grant of amnesty is difficult to obtain in the
prison riot context, because the legislature will be unable to act as
quickly as may be necessary. Furthermore, even when amnesty is
granted properly by either the chief executive or the legislature, the
courts may find the grant invalid for a number of reasons.' 9 Thus, a
grant of amnesty may be of little use to inmates when the state brings
criminal charges against them.
Prisoners may bring suit to enforce an agreement negotiated during a prison riot, or they may use an agreement-such as a negotiated
grant of amnesty-as the basis of their defense to criminal prosecutions stemming from the prison riot. The stated policy of many correctional systems is not to negotiate a settlement with rioting prisoners. 50
The rationale underlying this policy is to discourage riots and the taking of hostages by the rioting inmates. It has also been argued that
negotiations will prevent the quick return to order that is necessary to
1' See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Knote v. United States, 95 U.S.
149 (1877); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871). These cases reject
the idea that there is a distinction of constitutional significance between pardon and

amnesty. They indicate that the differences between the two concepts do not justify
the conclusion that because the Constitution uses the term pardon the Executive does

not have the power to grant amnesty. But see Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79
(1915).
I' E.g., Way v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 3d. 165, 141 Cal. Rptr. 383

(1977); State v. Morris, 55 Ohio St. 2d 101, 378 N.E.2d 708 (1978).
'"See, e.g., ALA. CoNsT. art. V, § 124; CoLo. CoNsT. art. 4, § 7; IDAnio CoNST.
art. 4, §7; IowA Co NsT. art. 4, § 16; N.Y. CoNsr. art. 4, § 4.
'"See notes 150-63 and accompanying text infra.
ISoSee, e.g., AicA: Tnm OmciA. REPoRT, supra note 4, at 208-13; Garson,

supra note 1,passim. See also note 20 supra.
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prevent further personal injury and property damage.' In fact, however, negotiations often have been undertaken in prison riots,5 2 and
some commentators have argued that negotiations are preferable to
the forceful suppression of riots because they may limit the loss of life
and allow prisoners to air their grievances effectively
If the inmates and the prison officials do enter into a settlement
agreement, the issue becomes whether such an agreement is binding on
either group. Although this issue apparently has not been litigated in
the prison riot context, courts. have employed principles of contract
law to determine the validity of similar agreements between prisoners
and correctional officers in nonriot situations." 4 This section will outline the contractual analysis that is likely to be applied to agreements
negotiated durng a prison riot.
There are two threshold issues. First, the court must determine
whether the prisoners had the capacity to enter into the agreement
when it was made. A small minority of jurisdictions still retain civil
disability statutes that either explicitly or implicitly deny a convict the
power to contract or to enforce a contractual agreement. 155 In these
states, a negotiated agreement between prisoners and prison officials
probably would not be enforceable. The second threshold issue is
whether there was sufficient privity of contract. In most prison riots,
an inmate committee serves as the negotiating team for all prisoners." 6
"I See ATTICA: Tm OmPCLA. REPORT, supra note 4, at 208-13; Garson, supra
note 1, passim.
"32A negotiated settlement was attempted unsuccessfully in the Attica riot.
Negotiations were successful in bringing an end to a 1955 riot at the Wyoming State
Penitentiary and to a 1968 disturbance at the Oregon State Penitentiary. In the Oregon riot, the State Corrections Administrator negotiated with the inmates who had
taken 11 hostages and agreed to the inmates' demands for imporved medical care, an
elected inmate council, and a new warden. See Garson, supra note 1, at 417-19.

,13See id. at 419-21.
114

See generally Gutkin, The Enforceability of Prisoner-PrisonOfficial Agree-

ments, 7 MANrOBA L.J. 325 (1977).
'1See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 29-101 (1980). See generally Gutkin, supranote 154,
at 326-27; Special Project, supranote 52, at 1021-35; notes 51-52 and accompanying
text supra. See also Coffin v. Richard, 143 E2d 443, 455 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,

325 U.S. 887 (1945) (convict has no right to enter into and enforce a contract).
116See Gutkin, supra note 154, at 325-26, 328-29. A committee of inmates was

used in the negotiations at Attica. Likewise, a committee of nonprison officials was
used to carry the prisoners' demands to the prison administration during the negotiation process. See AncIA: T-m OmnciAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 235-38, 239.
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Under recognized contract principles, the prisoners who did not serve
on the inmate committee would lack privity to the settlement agreement. Because the prisoners would be third-party beneficiaries to the
agreement, however, they probably could sue to enforce it.'"
Beyond such preliminary considerations, the enforceability of a
settlement agreement turns on the question of whether there is consideration supporting the agreement. Under well-established common
law principles, a party who performs or promises to perform a prior
legal obligation or who promises to refrain from doing something that
he or she is not legally privileged to do has not incurred detriment. A
contract based upon such an act or promise, therefore, is not binding
for lack of consideration.'" For example, if rioting prisoners agree to
release their hostages or to return to their cells in return for concessions on the part of the prison administration, the prisoners are promising to perform an existing legal obligation.' 59 Several courts have
employed consideration analysis to invalidate agreements between
prisoners and prison officials. 6 '
Even where there has been consideration, the courts have been
unwilling to uphold agreements between prisoners and prison officials.
For example, courts have indicated that they will not enforce agreements that are made under duress. This situation could arise in the
prison riot context if prison officials were hostages at the time they
signed the agreement."'6 Moreover, courts have been particularly reluctant to uphold agreements which provide for amnesty or for immunity
from prosecution for crimes arising out of the incident which gave rise
to the negotiated agreement. They have found such agreements to be
"I See J. CALAm & J. PERILO, THE LAw oF CONTRACTS § 17-1 (2d ed.

1977).

See Id. § 4-7. See generally IA A. CoRBiN, CONTRACTS §§ 171-192 (1963).
"' Under federal law and often under state law as well it is a crime to riot or to
take hostages. See notes 116-40 and accompanying text supra.
6I See, e.g., United States v. Bridgeman, 523 E2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Gorham, 523 E2d 1088 (D.C. Cir.
1975). Cf. Peraish v. Wyrick, 589 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. App. 1979) (prisoner's claim that
he had contractual right to credit on his sentence for merit time rejected in part
because prisoner's obedience to penitentiary rules was a preexisting legal duty).
262 United States v. West, 607 E2d 300, 303-04 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Bridgeman, 523 F2d 1099, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976);
United States v. Gorham, 523 E2d 1088, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
IS
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invalid on two grounds: first, that prison officials lack constitutional
authority to grant amnesty or immunity; and second, that agreements
not to prosecute criminal offenses are contrary to public policy.'62
In short, it is unlikely that the courts will enforce any agreement
negotiated during a prison riot. One might defend this result as necessary to ensure that prison officials are accorded wide latitude in their
efforts to maintain security in the prison. 1 3 Furthermore, enforcement of such agreements might intimate that prison riots are a legitimate way to attempt to change prison conditions.
On the other hand, judicial refusal to enforce prisoner-prison
official agreements discourages the use of peaceful means to settle
prison riots. Moreover, judicial invalidation of bargains which are
made in good faith, and on which the prisoners rely, may operate to
deepen the prisoners' distrust of the legal system. Prison officials who
wish to encourage peaceful settlemeits of riots and who wish to reestablish prison morale thus may be well-advised to comply voluntarily
with settlement agreements.
E. FirstAmendment Implications
The news media play a vital role in disseminating information
about prison conditions and inmate demands.' 61 It nevertheless has
been argued that media coverage may serve to prolong prison riots, to
limit the effectiveness of official attempts to negotiate a settlement,
and to disrupt prison security.' 6 These competing values-the need to
subject prisons to public scrutiny and the need to bring prison riots
under control quickly-provoke two questions. First, do prison
inmates have a first amendment right to have the media present in the
,62 See, e.g., United States v. Bridgeman, 523 E2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); United States v. Gorham, 523 E2d 1088 (D.C. Cir.
1975). In both decisions, the court found that the agreements were against public
policy, and that the prison official lacked the power to grant amnesty. These factors,
combined with duress and the lack of consideration, invalidated the agreements. See
Gutkin, supranote 154, at 335. For a discussion of the power to grant amnesty under
state and federal law, see notes 141-49 and accompanying text supra.
163 See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
164 See ATTICA: Tnn OFFciAL REPORT, supra note 4, at 213.
6I

See id.;Fox, supranote 3, at 11.
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prison during and after a prison riot? Second, do the media have a
special right of access to prisons?
In Pell v. Procunier,166
the Supreme Court upheld a California
Department of Corrections regulation that banned face-to-face interviews between members of the media and individual prisoners whom
they specifically requested to interview. The Court dismissed the
inmates' claim that the regulation violated their constitutional right to
freedom of speech, 167 stating that a "lawful incarceration brings
about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and
rights, a retraction justified by considerations underlying our penal
system." 6 According to the Court, a prison inmate retains those first
amendment rights that are consistent with the inmate's status as a prisoner and the "legitimate penological objectives of the corrections sys-

tem." 169
The Court based its holding on three factors. First, the prisoners
had viable alternative means by which to communicate with the
media.' Second, the regulation is content neutral.'7 I Third, the regulation was consistent with the legitimate goal of maintaining prison
security.' 2 Thus, in order to challenge a restriction on access to the
press as an infringement on their first amendment rights, prisoners
must demonstrate that no alternative means of communication are
available, that the prison regulation is not content neutral, or that
officials acted unreasonably in light of legitimate penological interests.' 73 This is a particularly high burden in view of the "unwillingness
[of the Court] to consider First Amendment claims of prisoners absent
extraordinary circumstances."7'
417 U.S. 817 (1974).
See id. at 822-24.
61Id. at 822, quoting Price v. Johnston, 334-U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
169 Id.
70 Id. at 824-27. According to the Court, the inmates could write letters to the
press or convey messages to the press through individuals permitted to visit them. Id.
166

167

'"

Id. at 828.
Id. at 826-27.

17,

'"See Comment, Bans on Interviews of Prisoners: Prisonerand PressRights

After Pell and Saxbe, 9 U.S.E L. REv. 718, 728-29 (1975). See generally Calhoun,
The First Amendment Rights of Prisoners, in 2 PRSsoNERs' RIGHTS SoURcEBOOK:

THEoRY, LrrIGATION, PRACTICE 43-65 (I. Robbins ed. 1980).
"' Comment, supra note 173, at 729. The Supreme Court has invalidated regu-.
lations that allow censorship of prison inmates' mail by prison officials as violative of
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In the prison riot context, the inmates might attempt to meet the
burden by arguing that, given the need to communicate with the press
quickly, there were no alternatives to immediate contact with the press.
The state, however, has a readily available counterargument: the need
to secure and to maintain order is particularly acute in the prison riot
context.
The Supreme Court has also determined that the press does not
have a special right of access to prisons. Although recognizing the
important role that the media play in informing the public about
prison conditions,' the Court has held that the press has no greater
right of access to prisons than that enjoyed by the general public.'
According to the Court, the first amendment protects the communication of information but does not guarantee that the press can receive
77
information.
In Pell,the Court followed its traditional, deferential approach to
prison administrators, accepting the prison officials' judgment about
the degree of regulation that was necessary to maintain prison security. 78 Similarly, in one of the special access cases, the Court deferred
to the legislature on the question of when prisons should be subject to
public scrutiny.' 79 In the prison riot context, judicial deference may be
more pronounced. In Burnham v. Oswald,"' for example, a federal
judge upheld restrictions on media access to Attica inmates during the
the first amendment. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974). There the Court
stated that such prison regulations would be valid (1) if "the regulation or practice
•.. further[s] an important or substantial governmental interest," and (2) if the limitation is "no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular
governmental interest involved:' Id. at 413. Significantly, the Court did not use this
standard in Pell. One might conclude that prison security is considered by the Court
to be such an important governmental interest that, unless the regulation or practice
operates to silence the inmate completely, it will be upheld.
7I See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8 (1978).
'16 See id.; Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974).
. 'See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966); Grosjean v. American Press
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
"7 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. at 827; Comment, supra note 173, at 728-29.
" See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12 (1978) ("Whether the government should open penal institutions ... is a question of policy which a legislative
body might appropriately resolve one way or the other!').
180 333 E Supp. 1128 (N.D.N.Y. 1971).

772

Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review

[Vol. 16

post-riot period. Noting that reasonable people might differ about
whether the restrictions were necessary, the court concluded that "a
federal court will not substitute its own judgment about what restrictions are required for the safety and security of the institution for that
of the prison administrator unless a violation of constitutional rights is
clear." I8
In sum, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to provide an

enforceable right to public scrutiny of prisons. In foreclosing this avenue of expression and its consequent relief of tensions and frustrations, the Court may have increased the odds that prison riots will
occur. As one commentator has explained, the Court's decisions "may
have the unfortunate effect of blocking a necessary and personal conduit for the expression of grievances, thereby making it more difficult
to uncover legitimate sources of discontent before they grow beyond
control." 82
IV. Prison Riots and the Guards
Prison guards are often injured in the course of prison riots. In
Attica
prison riot, for example, thirty-three correctional employees
the
were injured, and eleven correctional employees were killed.' 3 A
prison guard or a family member might bring a tort suit, but such a
suit faces substantial obstacles. If the defendant is a prisoner, damages
will be difficult to recover.'8 4 If the prison guard or a family member
sues the government or its employees, the various problems of immunity that arise in suits against the state must be overcome. 8 5 In order
to protect prison guards from the uncertainty of state tort suits, both
federal and state statutes provide for some form of compensation for
injuries which prison guards may incur.
Id. at 1131.
,, Comment, Freedom of the Press-PrisonRegulation ProhibitingInterviews
"'

Between Newsmen and Inmates Held Constitutional,60 CoRNELL L. Rlv. 446, 465

(1975).
"I See ATTICA: TnE OrsmcrAL REPORT, supra note 4, app. E & E

'"4 "The criminal offender's lack of financial resources often precludes recovery
of damages" by victims for wrongful acts by the offender. Comment, Victims' Suits

Against Government Entities and Officialsfor Reckless Release, 29 AM. U.L. REv.
595, 595 n.2 (1980).

"IS
See notes 53-58 and accompanying text supra.
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A. Recovery Under FederalLaw

The most important federal statute for compensation of injured
prison guards is the Federal Employees' Compensation Act
(FECA),"'6 which provides that the United States shall pay varying

degrees of compensation" 7 "for disability or death of an employee
resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of
his duty.. . "I The statute covers any "officer or employee in any
branch of the Government of the United States." 1 9 A federal correc-

tional officer injured in a riot clearly would fall within the statute's
scope.
However, two aspects of the FECA limit the amount of compensation that a prison guard may receive. First, an individual whose
injury or death is compensable under the FECA is precluded from
bringing suit and recovering from the United States for negligence
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),190 even though recovery
186

5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1976).

The amount of compensation is a designated percentage, which varies according to the injury, of the employee's monthly pay. For example, if an employee is
totally disabled by the injury, he or she will receive two-thirds of his or her monthly
pay at the time of the injury. See id. § 8105. See generally id. § 8107.
Is Id. § 8102(a). This section of the Act goes on to state that compensation by
the United States is not allowed if the injury or death is "(1) caused by willful misconduct of the employee; (2) caused by the employee's intention to bring about injury or
death to himself or another; or (3) proximately caused by the intoxication of the
injured employee." Id. The FECA also authorizes (1) the payment or provision of
medical services, see id. § 8103; (2) compensation for dependents of injured employees, see id. § 8110; and (3) special provisions for death by injury occurring during the
performance of duty, see id. § 8133.
189 Id. § 8101(1)(A).
"9 See id. § 8116(c) which provides in relevant part:
117

The liability of the United States ... under this subchapter ... with
respect to the injury or death of an employee is exclusive and instead of all
other liability of the United States... to the employee, his legal representative, spouse, dependents, next of kin, and any other person otherwise entitled to recover damages from the United States or the instrumentality
because of the injury or death in a direct judicial proceeding, in a civil
action ... or by an administrative or judicial proceeding under a workmen's compensation statute or under a Federal tort liability statute....
See generally Annot., 17 L.Ed.2d 929 (1967). See also notes 73-92 and accompanying
text supra.
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under the FTCA might be substantially higher than compensation
under the FECA.I9 ' The rationale for this rule, according to one court,
is that employees in positions involving a high degree of physical risk
should not be "relegated to a remedy in tort but rather [should] be
protected by a well-defined system of compensation for the hazards of
their employment."' 92 Second, if a federal employee successfully sues a
third party for damages arising from injuries that are compensable
under the FECA, the employee must refund to the United States a
sizeable portion of any compensation received under the FECA and
credit the amount of recovery from the third party against future compensation payable under the FECA.193 A federal prison guard who is
injured in a riot may prefer to accept guaranteed compensation under
the FECA, rather than expend the time and money required to prosecute a tort suit.
B. Recovery Under State Law
Many states have statutory schemes that provide for compensation of state prison guards who are injured or killed in prison riots. 94
In several states, the worker's compensation statute covers prison
,91See, e.g., Lewis v. United States, 190 E2d 22 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Tredway v.
District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732 (D.C. 1979).
"' Lewis v. United States, 190 E2d 22, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1951). Accord, Tredway v.
District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732, 734 (D.C. 1979).
193 See 5 U.S.C. § 8132 (1976) which provides in relevant part:
If an injury or death for which compensation is payable under this subchapter is caused under circumstances creating a legal liability in a person
other than the United States to pay damages, and a beneficiary entitled to
compensation from the United States for that injury or death receives
money or other property in satisfaction of that liability as the result of suit
or settlement by him or in his behalf, the beneficiary, after deducting therefrom the costs of suit and a reasonable attorney's fee, shall refund to the
United States the amount of compensation paid by the United States and
credit any surplus on future payments of compensation payable to him by
the United States for the same injury...
191See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T
ANN.

CODE §§

21363.3-21363.6 (West 1980); N.M.

§§ 52-1-3 & 52-1 to -3.1 (Cum. Supp. 1981); N.Y. WoRK. Comp.

Group 15 (McKinney 1965). See generally Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 415 (1949).

STAT.
LAW § 3,
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guards.' 95 The courts in some of these jurisdictions have in turn held
that injuries received at the hands of a fellow employee are within the
purview of the worker's compensation statute.' 96 Therefore, if a prison
guard is injured by another guard during the course of a prison riot, he
or she may recover under that statute. 197 Because some state courts

also have permitted worker's compensation recovery for injuries
received from a third party, a prison guard may receive compensation
if he or she is injured by an inmate during a prison riot.19
Several states have specific statutes that govern the compensation

of correctional officers injured by inmates. 199 Pennsylvania, for example, provides that if a correctional officer is injured by an inmate, the

officer shall be paid his or her full salary, as well as medical and hospital expenses, for the duration of the disability.200 If the injury results in

the death of the officer, the survivors of the deceased shall receive fifty
percent of the full salary of the deceased. 0 '
If an injury is compensable under the state worker's compensa-

tion statute the statutory remedy may be exclusive, with the possible
exception in some jurisdictions for injuries that are intentionally
inflicted by the state. 2 Similarly, in states with specific statutory pro,95See, e.g., Rendleman v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 242 Cal. App. 2d 32,
50 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1966); Miller v. Hoyle, 328 So. 2d 757 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Selibolt
v. County of Middlesex, 366 Mass. 411, 319 N.E.2d 448 (1974); Smith v. State, 72
A.D.2d 937, 422 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1979); Schanz v. Bureau of Corrections, 52 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 300, 415 A.2d 978 (1980).
196
Seee.g., Seymour v. Rivera Appliances Corp., 28 N.Y2d 406, 322 N.YS.2d
243, 271 N.E.2d 224 (1971) (award of workmen's compensation will be maintained
for injury from co-employee's assault as long as there is any nexus between the
assault and the employment).
"I See, e.g., Smith v. State, 72 A.D.2d 937, 422 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1979).
9' See, e.g., Miller v. Hoyle, 328 So. 2d 757 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (vidow of
prison guard killed in riot received workers' compensation under Louisiana statute);
Selibolt v. County of Middlesex, 366 Mass. 411, 319 N.E.2d 448 (1974) (prison guard
injured in altercation with inmate received workers' compensation under Massachusetts statute).
"I See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 21363.3-21363.6 (West 1980); CoNN. GEN.
STAT. § 5-142 (1981); PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 951 (Purdon 1964).
210 PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 951 (Purdon 1964).
201

Id.

See, e.g., Miller v. Hoyle, 328 So. 2d 757 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Smith v. State,
72 A.D.2d 937, 422 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1979).
20,
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visions governing the compensation of prison guards, recovery under
such provisions may be exclusive.203
The specific form of compensation for physical injuries incurred
during a prison riot will depend on the statutory scheme of the jurisdiction, but some form of compensation is likely. More problematic is
the question whether prison guards or their families may recover for
injuries that are caused by the stress coincident with involvement in a
riot. One state court has permitted recovery under worker's compensation for the suicide, following a nervous breakdown, of a correctional
20
officer who was involved in an effort to quell a prison disturbance.
Another state court has taken a more restrictive view, denying recovery where a corrections officer died from a heart attack suffered after
a violent argument with a group of inmates. The court reasoned that
the heart attack was not an "accident" within the meaning of the state
compensation statute. 0 5
Conclusion
A prison riot brings public attention-for better or for worse-to
our penal institutions. Thus, greater heed should be paid to the causes
of riots, for until we better understand what motivates individuals, the
system that deals with riots is certain to be flawed. In the meantime,
there exists a body of private and public law, surveyed in this Article,
that can deal with the legal problems that riots engender. The law is far
from perfect, and, in many cases, was not developed with either prisoners or prison riots in mind. While we search for the ultimate solution, however, the existing law must be made workable. Here, as elsewhere in the legal system, we shall simply have to feel our way.

201 See, e.g., PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 951 (Purdon 1964). But see Department of Corrections v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 23 Cal. 3d 197, 152
Cal. Rptr. 345, 589 P.2d 583 (1979) (dependent of correctional officer may recover
under both special death benefits statute and worker's compensation statute).
204Fitzgibbon's
203 Jolly

1391 (1974).

Case, 374 Mass. 633, 373 N.E.2d 1174 (1978).
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